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THE SHIFTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF CONTINGENT 
EMPLOYMENT: A PROPOSAL TO REFORM WORK 
Kevin J. Doyle* 
INTRODUCTION 
The American labor market has undergone dramatic changes in 
the last two decades.1  Most notably, the high technology market has 
created an unpredictable economy whose labor needs are subject to 
sudden demand as well as the ordinary vicissitudes of the market.2  As 
a matter of sound human resource management and thrifty business 
policy, companies have developed ways of dealing strategically with 
their fluctuating demand for quality labor.3  The most controversial 
of these measures, and the subject of this Comment, is the 
employment of temporary staff, or “contingent” workers. 
The temporary worker is a familiar part of the employment 
landscape.  American companies have become increasingly reliant on 
their “temps” because they bring comparable skill to the workplace 
without the accompanying cost.4  It is not difficult to see why 
employers often prefer to utilize contingent workers instead of 
permanent employees.  Temporary personnel relieve the company of 
its usual obligations: withholding of taxes, overtime pay provisions, 
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 1 Immanuel Ness, Labor’s New Frontier, 4 WORKINGUSA 3, 3 (2001) (listing among 
the most significant changes: workers are working longer days; the emergence of the 
cyber-workplace; and an increase in non-standard work arrangements, especially the 
low-wage temporary employee). 
 2 Paul Kellogg, Independent Contractor or Employee: Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 1775, 1802-03 (1999) (discussing the instability inherent to the 
computer industry because of the highly competitive software market and the 
shifting demands of the consumer). 
 3 Katherine M. Forster, Strategic Reform of Contingent Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 
541-42 (2001) (noting that temporary employees generally receive less pay than 
regular employees, thus allowing employers to improve profit margins). 
 4 Id. 
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unemployment and workers’ compensation obligations, federal 
discrimination provisions, OSHA and state occupational safety 
requirements, family and medical leave obligations, and certain 
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.5  Even an employer 
with the best intentions understands that there is a powerful incentive 
to cut costs and minimize legal liabilities by using this attractive labor 
alternative.6  Additionally, workers who do not have the status of 
“employees” are less likely to attempt unionization because the law 
often does not recognize the rights of non-employee laborers to 
bargain collectively.7 
In 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
sent shock waves through the employment world with its decision in 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation.8  The Ninth Circuit found that despite 
their label as “independent contractors,” the workers were “common 
law employees” and thus entitled to the benefits accorded permanent 
employees.9  Vizcaino  sparked wide debate over the rights of 
contingent workers in the integrated10 workplace, including the right 
to bargain collectively with the employer.11  Presently, management 
and the contingent workforce generally are at an impasse.  
Management asserts that it is its prerogative within the law to meet 
hiring needs while cutting costs.12  Contingent workers contend that 
they are being exploited when employers retain them beyond a 
temporary period and refuse to give them compensation and other 
benefits equal to their permanent counterparts.13 
As an extension of the human person, labor can either serve to 
 
 5 Susan L. Coskey, Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation; A Labor and Employment 
Lawyer’s Perspective, 73 LAB. L.J. 91, 92 (1997). 
 6 Id. at 92 (suggesting that it is not surprising that contingent employment is 
“growing between forty to seventy-five percent faster than employment for the 
economy as a whole” because of the “great savings on paper” and the simplicity with 
which the employer can expand or reduce its staff). 
 7 Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board’s Treatment of Temporary 
Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (2000) 
(discussing the employer’s statutory right under the NLRA to prohibit temporary 
workers from joining the collective bargaining unit of regular employees). 
 8 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996) 
 9 Id. at 1195, 1200. 
 10 “Integrated” in this context indicates a workplace in which permanent 
employees and temporary employees work together and are indistinguishable in 
terms of duties and responsibilities. 
 11 See, e.g., Christopher D. Cook, Temps Demand a New Deal, THE NATION, Mar. 27, 
2000, at 16 (contrasting attempts by organizations to secure rights for temps with 
those of the temp industry, which asserts that the current law supports an employer’s 
right to distinguish between classes of workers). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Aaron Bernstein, A Leg Up for the Lowly Temp, BUS. WK., June 21, 1999, at 102. 
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enhance or denigrate human dignity.  Ultimately our labor and 
employment laws should be judged by what they contribute to human 
dignity and the just social order, not solely by how they aid in the 
functioning of a capitalist economy.  In short, we need to understand 
what the good human life requires, and then strive to shape our laws 
accordingly.  In the arena of contingent work, this will require a 
transformation in our understanding of work and the role it plays in 
social life.  This Comment ultimately proposes that the issue of 
contingent work not only sounds in contract law and economics, but 
also in human rights and moral obligation. 
The critical framework I will use to evaluate the legal regime 
governing contingent employment is derived from well-developed 
principles of Catholic Social Thought,14 a body of wisdom reflecting a 
certain conception of the human person and the just society.  Part I 
of this Comment sets forth the major principles of Catholic Social 
Thought and their impact on the areas of labor and employment.  
Part II outlines the legal background of contingent employment, 
including the landmark Vizcaino decision.  Part II  also analyzes a 
recent decision handed down by the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) that may expand significantly the collective bargaining rights 
of contingent workers.  Finally, Part III critiques these legal 
developments using Catholic Social Thought as the standard for 
desirable labor and employment laws. 
I.  LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 
Scholars generally accept that Catholic Social Thought, 
particularly in its American application, has its origin in Pope Leo 
XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum (The Condition of Labor).15  The 
rise of the secular state, the increasing intellectual influence of 
Darwinism, and the Industrial Revolution profoundly transformed 
Western culture.16  In the wake of these movements, the laboring 
 
 14 See RODGER CHARLES S.J., AN INTRODUCTION TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 9 
(1999) (identifying Catholic Social Thought as contained in the Scriptures and the 
Tradition of the Church). 
 15 Yet some scholars place the genesis of modern Catholic Social Thought, or 
CST, in the eighteenth century.  See PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 9 
(David A. Boileau ed., 1994) (citing Benedict XIV’s (1740-1758) encyclicals in 
response to the Enlightenment and French Revolution as the proper inception of a 
systematic Catholic response to social developments). 
 16 Scholars argue that the Industrial Revolution changed the face of Europe, 
though they disagree on whether this change was in the best interest of the West.  See 
T.B. Macaulay, “Southey’s Colloquies,” in A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 
184-88 (John B. Harrison & Richard E. Sullivan eds., 1967) (arguing generally that 
the Industrial Revolution undeniably represented social progress, especially as it 
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classes often suffered the effects of low wages, unemployment, and 
degrading working conditions.17  With the publication of Rerum 
Novarum, the Church entered the modern debate on the just social 
order.  This Comment focuses mainly on the Catholic theory of labor. 
A.  Harmony Between Classes 
The Catholic vision of labor relations is not adversarial; it is a 
cooperative model based on mutual dependence between employer 
and employee.18  While traditional socialist and capitalist theories see 
labor and management as mutually antagonistic, Rerum Novarum 
articulates a harmony between and among various social groups. 
The Church’s metaphor for a well-ordered society is the human 
body.19  The health of the entire organism is dependent upon the 
functioning of the individual parts.20  No part is inferior to another in 
that each contributes equally to the well-being of the whole.21  
Although the analogy is simplistic, it reflects an approach to labor 
questions that is markedly different from those adopted in the last 
two centuries.22  The industrial upheavals that began in the 
nineteenth century dramatically increased the potential for profit 
among manufacturers.23  The machine would produce as long as 
 
helped to alleviate poverty among the agrarian classes.  Macaulay also charged 
opponents of the Industrial Revolution with an effete aestheticism that valued 
romantic notions of the good life over genuine improvements in people’s lives.).  But 
see id.  See also John L. Hammond & Barbara Hammond, “The Rise of Modern Industry,” 
supra, at 206-07 (arguing that increasing industrialization served to deprive people of 
civilizing influences and instead enslaved people to the work process: 
 For the new town [resulting from the Industrial Revolution] was not a 
home where man could find beauty, happiness, leisure, learning, 
religion – the influences that civilize outlook and habit; but a bare and 
desolate place, without colour, air, or laughter, where man, woman, 
and child worked, ate, and slept.  This was to be the lot of the mass of 
mankind . . . . The new factories and the new furnaces were like the 
Pyramids, telling of man’s enslavement, rather than of his power . . . .). 
 17 2 PHILIP S. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 14-
15 (1955). 
 18 Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (On the Condition of Labor, 1891) 15, reprinted in 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 20 (David J. O’Brien & 
Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1995) (All references to papal encyclicals hereinafter are 
found in this edition unless otherwise noted.) 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 1 FONER, supra note 17, at 69 (noting that the first American trade unions in 
the 1790s arose in response to the arrival of the “merchant capitalist” and the 
subsequent disintegration of employer/employee cooperation.  The two classes thus 
became mutually antagonistic). 
 23 2 id. at 14. 
 2003 COMMENT 645 
there was a man or woman to operate it.  With profit as their primary 
motive in organizing the workplace, managers and owners viewed the 
workers as simply another factor in the calculus of productivity.24  
Quite simply, the concepts of labor and capital had merged and the 
employee became an instrumentality indistinguishable from the 
machine he operated.25 
While traditional Marxism posits that the means to rectify this 
imbalance of power is by reducing property to common ownership,26 
the Church reinforces the importance of private property and 
suggests that the answer lies not in rearranging schemes of 
ownership, but in reintroducing the notion of justice to existing 
employment relationships.27  Justice requires the fulfillment of 
agreements equitably made and  deference to the dignity of both 
parties.28  Specifically, justice calls upon workers to carry out their 
contracts, to refrain from destroying capital, to favor amicable 
settlements of grievances, to reject violence in representing their 
position, to avoid “riot and disorder,” and to disavow contact with 
those who promise satisfaction but employ dubious means.29  
Conversely, the employer must recognize that employees are not 
indentured servants, that the laboring individual possesses a unique 
dignity, that the employee works in order to live a decent and 
honorable life, and that workers are never a means by which to make 
 
 24 Id. at 14-15 (noting that the rise of industrialism signaled the demise of the 
craftsman and the birth of the mass-produced commodity.  With the emphasis 
shifted from quality to quantity, the worker was no longer needed for his creative 
faculties, but for his rather mundane ability to monitor the machine). 
 25 Karl Marx offers one of the most penetrating analyses of work and man in the 
modern age, particularly the potential for work to dehumanize the person as he 
devotes ever more of himself to material production:  
The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces, the more 
his production increases in power and extent.  The worker becomes an 
ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he produces . . . .  
Labor not only produces commodities; it also produces itself and the 
workers as a commodity and it does so in the same proportion in which it 
produces commodities in general.   
KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 323-34 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton trans.).   
Marx correlates directly the objectification of man as an instrumentality with 
society’s increased capacity for production.  Id.  Explosive economic growth such as 
that witnessed during the Industrial Revolution often follows innovations in 
technology.  Id.  If periods of technological transformation pose the greatest threat 
to working conditions, as Marx seems to suggest, then perhaps it is not surprising 
that the contingent worker situation should arise out of the current high-tech arena. 
 26 KARL MARX, COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 878, 889 (Steven Cahn ed., 1990). 
 27 Rerum Novarum 16, supra note 18, at 21. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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money at any expense.30  Most significantly, the Church proffers an 
elevated vision of workers, one that views people not as a product of 
what they do for a living, but as beings of depth who require 
fulfillment on a “spiritual and mental” level.31  Justice recognizes that 
both labor and management have their own priorities, and calls upon 
each side to advance its goals in a way consistent with the dignity of 
all persons.32 
B.  Dignity of Labor 
The Catholic philosophy of labor is comprehensive.33  It 
acknowledges that work is a phenomenon common to all of 
humanity,34 whether one occupies the position of employer or 
employee.35  It is also pragmatic in its recognition that management 
usually possesses greater wealth and material resources.36  As such, 
workers are generally in a weaker position to alter working conditions 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 DAVID HOLLENBACH, JUSTICE, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERICAN CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL ETHICS IN A PLURALISTIC CONTEXT 38-39 (discussing how Catholic labor 
theory, particularly as contained in John Paul II’s encyclical Laborem Exercens, ranges 
from concern for individual human fulfillment at work to the threat posed by labor 
distribution on the international level).  John Paul II describes the depth and 
breadth of work in the human condition in Laborem Exercens: “[M]an’s life is built up 
every day from work, from work it derives its specific dignity, but at the same time 
work contains the unceasing measure of human toil and suffering, and also of the 
harm and injustice which penetrate deeply into social life within individual nations 
and on the international level.”  Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (On Human 
Work, 1981) 1, at 352. 
 34 John Paul outlines the distinctiveness of labor in the created order and its 
position as something unique to humanity and not shared with any other form of 
life: “Man is made to be in the visible universe an image and likeness of God himself, 
and he is placed in it in order to subdue the earth.  From the beginning therefore he 
is called to work.  Work is one of the characteristics that distinguish man from the rest of the 
creatures, whose activity for sustaining their lives cannot be called work . . . .  Thus 
work bears a particular mark of man and of humanity, the mark of a person 
operating within a community of persons.”  Introduction to Laborem Exercens, supra note 
33, at 352. 
 35 HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 41 (noting that “[t]he human person is the 
image of God partly through the mandate received from the creator to subdue, to 
dominate, the earth.  In carrying out this mandate, humankind, every human being, 
reflects the very action of the creator of the universe.”) (emphasis added). 
 36 Catholic Social Thought acknowledges that the systematic response of the 
Church beginning with Rerum Novarum was justified under “principles of social 
morality.”  Liberalism, as embodied by the capitalist economic system, “strengthened 
and safeguarded economic initiative by the possessor of capital alone, but did not 
pay sufficient attention to the rights of the workers . . . .”  Rerum Novarum 8, supra 
note 18, at 362.  This reality in turn gave rise to worker solidarity movements as a 
means of balancing the respective rights of labor and management. 
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set up by the employer who can simply replace objecting employees.37  
Absent any real influence in the employment relationship, the worker 
has no choice but to subject himself to the vagaries and indignities of 
the marketplace.  But Rerum Novarum opposes this proposition with 
the bedrock principle of its labor proposal; namely, that all work is 
dignified because “the true dignity and excellence of man lies in his 
moral qualities, that is, in virtue; that virtue is the common 
inheritance of all, equally within the reach of high and low, rich and 
poor . . . .”38  Pope Leo XIII grounds his assertion that all work has 
dignity in Christology.39  Christ himself chose to realize the 
 
 37 MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS MATTER 10 (1998). 
 38 Rerum Novarum 20, supra note 18, at 23. 
 39 Id.  “Christology” is the study of the nature of Christ, particularly with regard to 
what his life can tell us about how human life is to be lived and what the attributes of 
a just society are.  See The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System, discussing the 
Christian belief in Christ as more than symbolic: 
By the act of coming into the world as a human being, Christ fully 
identified himself with those for whom he came . . . .  He constituted 
himself as the unsurpassable symbol by all the mysteries of his life, 
including, climactically, his passion, death, and risen life.  In the 
earthly ministry of Jesus each major event gives a further enrichment to 
his humanity and consequently to our ability to perceive him as God’s 
definitive self-disclosure. 
AVERY DULLES S.J., THE CRAFT OF THEOLOGY: FROM SYMBOL TO SYSTEM 27 (1992); see 
also RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 493 (1994) (identifying a distinction between 
Christology “from below” and Christology “from above.”  The former emphasizes the 
“Jesus of history, a human being like us in all things except sin, who stands out from 
the rest of the human race by his proclamation of, and commitment to, the 
Kingdom, or reign, of God.”  The latter “begins with the preexistent Word of God in 
heaven, who ‘comes down’ to earth to take on human flesh and redeem us by dying 
on the cross, rising from the dead, and returning to enjoy an exalted state as Lord in 
heaven.”).  Id. 
The essence of this idea is captured well in the encyclical Redemptor Hominis: 
God entered the history of humanity and, as a man, became an actor in 
that history, one of the thousands of millions of human beings but at 
the same time Unique!  Through the Incarnation God gave human life 
the dimension that he intended man to have from his first beginning; 
he has granted that dimension definitively – in the way that is peculiar 
to him alone . . . . 
Pope John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis (The Redeemer of Man, 1979) 1.2, reprinted in THE 
ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 46-47 (J. Michael Miller C.S.B. ed., 1996). 
According to Christian belief, therefore, the historical Jesus as portrayed in the 
New Testament is a source of moral and ethical wisdom.  The Incarnation, the act of 
God assuming human form while also retaining His divine nature, was a profound 
act of love because it gave humanity God in its midst.  No longer simply the object of 
philosophical speculation, God in the person of Jesus experiences the human 
condition fully, ultimately rises above its travails, and fulfills his temporal purpose.  
As such, the historical Jesus is not only to be studied, but emulated.  See CATECHISM 
OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, at 471 § 1694. 
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Incarnation—the act of becoming human—as a carpenter,40 a 
profession associated with common origins and the working class.  
The significance of Christ as carpenter to labor theory lies in its 
intimation that dignity is a function of our common humanity and 
not the particular profession in which we are engaged.41  It suggests 
that any just employment relationship will be radically egalitarian42—
it will treat both sides as equally deserving of just treatment regardless 
of who is in a position of greater wealth or power.43 
C.  Work is Not Humankind’s Ultimate Purpose 
Catholic Social Thought squarely rejects the tendency of 
modern society to view work as an end unto itself, subordinating 
other concerns to it, and demanding that we order our other 
priorities to it.44  Work is instead relegated to the status of a means to 
the final end, which is God.45  In Catholic theology, humankind 
originates in God and receives its nature from God.46  By this nature, 
 
 40 Mark 6:2-3. 
 41 See CHARLES, supra note 14, at 63, stating: 
Work has been given a new dignity by the example of God the Son 
made man, who spent most of his life on earth working with his hands 
for a living . . . . All honest work is ennobled in that it is man, made in 
God’s image and likeness, who does it.  The subject of work is more 
important than the work done or the object achieved by it. 
 42 The egalitarian ideal refers to the equal dignity of all people before God.  It 
thus provides a basis for ensuring that both employer and employee treat each other 
fairly in establishing their working arrangement.  It is not, as the Marxist notion 
seems to suggest, an assertion that distinctions among people are inherently unjust 
(e.g. rich/poor, employer/employee).  The Catholic vision thus does not object to 
the notion of class, but insists on the equal worth of all people. 
 43 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter 
on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy 302, at 648 (United States Catholic 
Conference, 1986).  The bishops of the United States have called for “ new patterns 
of partnership” in the workplace in order to ensure that workers and management 
receive just treatment: 
 Partnerships between labor and management are possible only when 
both groups possess real freedom and power to influence decisions.  
This means that unions ought to continue to play an important role in 
moving toward greater economic participation within firms and 
industries . . . . For partnership to be genuine it must be a two-way 
street, with creative initiative and a willingness to cooperate on all sides.  
Id.  Gould argues that such employee participation initiatives on a global scale 
are a major factor in the impending transformation in labor-management 
industrial relations.  See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 109 
(1993). 
 44 Rerum Novarum 32, supra note 18, at 29. 
 45 Id. 
 46 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 11-12 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 
1988). 
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human beings hold as their ultimate goal the return to the source of 
their creation.47  During their lives on earth, men and women use 
their work as one means “to that attainment of truth and that practice 
of goodness in which the full life of the soul consists.”48  By virtue of 
his creation, each person is vested with an inviolable dignity that 
directs man back to God as his ultimate end.49  Man’s work, therefore, 
must do nothing to impugn that dignity and thereby impede man in 
the fulfillment of his final purpose.50  The Church states emphatically 
its opposition to a social order that permits its citizens to live in an 
oppressive culture of work. 51  Indeed, Rerum Novarum dismisses the 
contention that the employment relationship is essentially a 
contractual one that simply reflects the acceptance by both parties of 
its terms and conditions.52  The individual has no right to enter into 
contracts, however voluntary, that are “calculated to defeat the end 
and purpose of his being.”53 
This proposition stands in stark contrast to the classical theory of 
contract law that once governed American employment law 
jurisprudence.54  At the turn of the last century, the United States 
Supreme Court was loathe to interfere with the contractual 
relationship absent clear evidence of a State’s legitimate police 
 
 47 JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 15 (John J. Fitzgerald 
trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1947). 
 48 Rerum Novarum 32, supra note 18, at 29. 
 49 Redemptor Hominis 11.2, supra note 39, at 60. (Redemptor Hominis describes this 
return to God as the “single goal to which is directed the deepest aspiration of the 
human spirit.”  By virtue of this aspiration, the human person is necessarily on a 
quest for “the full dimension of its humanity . . . the full meaning of human life.”). 
 50 Rerum Novarum 16, supra note 18, at 20-21. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.  at 31. 
 53 Id. at 32, at 29. (noting, for example, that such contracts would include those 
requiring work on Sundays, those requiring such excessive labor that they effectively 
treat the employee as an instrumentality, and any contracts not allowing for “proper 
rest for soul and body”). 
 54 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding 
unconstitutional a New York law setting maximum hours that bakers could work: 
“The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer 
and employees . . . .  The general right to make a contract in relation to his business 
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution.”). Chemerinsky notes that in Lochner the Court articulated the 
following three major principles: 1) Freedom of contract is a basic right protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) Government may interfere with the freedom 
of contract only to advance a valid police purpose, such as public safety, public 
health, or public morals; 3) The role of the Court is to “carefully scrutinize” 
legislation that hinders the freedom of contract.  See  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 8.2.2 (1997). 
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power.55  The contract represented the agreement of autonomous 
beings who were free to create whatever conditions suited their 
respective needs.56  It was not the province of the state generally to 
regulate even gross inequities in the resulting terms of the contract, 
unless such regulation was consistent with a state’s police power.57  
The prevailing laissez-faire philosophy of the day claimed to respect 
deeply man’s freedom to contract and therefore refused to regulate 
the products of this freedom.58  Against this backdrop, the Church’s 
view of the nature of contract represents a radical departure. 
Parties to an employment contract are bound not only by the 
precepts of human law, but also by the demands of the divine law.59  
While traditional contract law allowed man to accept onerous terms if 
he perceived that the resulting advantage was commensurate, the 
divine law denied man the right to accept such terms if they adversely 
affected his obligation to God.60  In strong language the encyclical 
asserts that the employee has no power whatsoever to consent to 
treatment that violates his dignity in the eyes of God:61 
To consent to any treatment which is calculated to defeat the end 
and purpose of his being is beyond his rights; he cannot give up 
 
 55 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53-54.  In the thirty years following Lochner, the Court 
struck down numerous social welfare laws. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 
161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (declaring unconstitutional laws 
that prohibited employers from requiring that employees not join a union); Adkins 
v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (declaring unconstitutional a law that set a 
minimum wage for women); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) (declaring 
unconstitutional a law that prohibited private employment agencies from charging a 
fee to employees). 
 56 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
 57 Id. at 53-54. 
 58 SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE STATE 140-41 (1964) 
(noting that the post-Civil War Supreme Court practiced a laissez-faire judicial 
philosophy in order to circumscribe the reach of social welfare legislation.).  The 
author also traces the evolution of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from “[b]road interpretations of liberty and property . . . [to] the 
derivative right of liberty of contract.”  Id.  The effect of the Court’s purported 
reverence for the freedom of contract was to seriously hinder the enactment of 
progressive social legislation.  Id. at 164.  In a coy assessment of the legal 
consequences of laissez-faire jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound wrote: 
Today, when [the judiciary] assumes to stand between the legislature 
and the public and thus again to protect the individual from the state, 
it really stands between the public and what the public needs and 
desires, and protects individuals who need no protection against 
society which does  need it. 
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 403 (1908). 
 59 Rerum Novarum, supra note 18, at 46. 
 60 Id. at 29. 
 61 Id. 
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his soul to servitude; for it is not man’s own rights which are here 
in question, but the rights of God, most sacred and inviolable.62 
It follows then that Catholic Social Thought will give this admonition 
meaning by defining in greater detail what constitutes the “end and 
purpose of being” and the “rights of God.”  The nature and purpose 
of human life thus gives rise to certain non-waivable protections.  
Most significant, however, is the articulation of a standard that must 
govern the relationship between employer and employee.  This 
standard is independent of any human law, country, or culture.  Yet it 
is universal in its obligation and invites man-made law to participate 
in its goals and reflect its priorities in its own codes. 
D.  Just Wages 
In determining the all-important question of the just wage, 
Catholic Social Thought once again takes issue with pure contract 
law.63  Under contract analysis, employer and employee agree to a 
certain level of compensation and injustice occurs only when the 
employer fails to pay or the employee refuses to work.64  In Catholic 
Social Thought, the wage represents more than the agreed-to 
compensation.  Rerum Novarum suggests that labor has a dual nature: 
1) personal—the worker chooses to sell his labor in exchange for some 
kind of personal profit; and 2) necessary—the worker labors in order 
to live.  Man must work in order to sustain his very existence.65  Our 
society tends to view the employee’s wage as a function of the 
personal aspect alone.66  As a personal concern, a working person is 
free to “accept any rate of wages whatever; for in the same way as he is 
free to work or not, so he is free to accept a small wage or even none 
at all.”67  But the Church insists that work is also necessary, which 
compels us to look beyond the wage quoted in the contract to see if it 
permits the worker to live in human dignity.68  The Church does not 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 31. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Rerum Novarum, supra note 18, at 31. 
 66 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Temporary Workers Seeking Code of Conduct for Job 
Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2000, at B1 (discussing the objection of temporary work 
agencies to industry-wide standards in the context of wages and benefits.  Agencies 
assert that such standards “like health insurance and a so-called living wage are 
unrealistically expensive.”).  Simply stated, the employer offers a wage and the 
employee accepts.  There is little concern for what standard of living this wage 
provides or how useful the wage is in effecting certain fundamental rights such as 
health care. 
 67 Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31. 
 68 CHARLES, supra note 14, at 81 (noting that in a free society wages must rely on 
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deny that free negotiation is a prerequisite to the establishment of a 
just wage, yet it reminds us that 
there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient 
than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration 
must be enough to support the wage earner in reasonable and 
frugal comfort . . . if through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the 
workman accepts harder conditions because an employer will give 
him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice.69 
As Patricia Ann Lamoureux has observed, Leo XIII framed the 
question of just remuneration in terms of the right to live in dignity, 
and this important step moved the issue “beyond free consent . . . to 
the level of justice in the relationship between two persons.”70  
Interestingly, Catholic Social Thought does not look to the State to 
remedy  such injustices directly.71  Rather it calls upon the State to 
 
free agreement between parties, but at the same time society has a duty to ensure 
that prevailing wages are sufficient to meet human needs). 
 69 Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31. 
 70 Patricia Ann Lamoureux, Justice for Wage Earners, HORIZONS (2001), at 213. 
 71 The Catholic position on the role of the State has steadily evolved from Rerum 
Novarum through Laborem Exercens while maintaining certain principles consistently.  
Consistent with its concern for the common good and its encouragement of 
communal action to remedy societal ills, the Church does not reject the potential 
power of the State to ensure that proper standards of individual well-being are 
maintained.  See A. Rauscher, Institutions of Social Organization: Family, Private Property, 
State, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 82 (David A. Boileau ed., 1994).  
Thus Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum places the primary onus on the State to “make sure 
that the laws and institutions, the general character and administration of the 
commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and 
private prosperity . . . for it is the province of the commonwealth to consult for the 
common good.”  Rerum Novarum 26, supra note 18, at 26.  This rather beneficent 
conception of the State would be profoundly challenged in the next century 
following the horrors of National Socialism and Stalinism.  With the publication of 
the encyclical Centesimus Annus in 1991 to mark the centenary of Rerum Novarum, 
John Paul II articulates a more ambiguous role for the State.  See J. Verstraeten, 
Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 145 (David A. 
Boileau ed., 1994) (noting that while John Paul II supports some state involvement 
in providing security for society, excessive dependence on the state creates a “loss of 
human energy and the exaggerated increase of governmental apparatus . . . .”).  The 
State has the responsibility to encourage the national economy and thereby create 
gainful employment.  It also occupies a position as defender of the most vulnerable 
in society.  Yet as J. Bryan Hehir has commented, these affirmative duties are 
tempered by a concern that the State vested with excessive powers tends to 
totalitarianism.  See J. Bryan Hehir, Reordering the World, in A NEW WORLDLY ORDER: 
JOHN PAUL II AND HUMAN FREEDOM 88 (George Weigel ed., 1992).  Therefore 
Centesimus Annus “espouse[s] an activist state, but one constrained by the principle of 
subsidiarity.”  Id.  Hehir also observes that John Paul II has added a critique of “the 
welfare state” which is new to Catholic Social Thought.  Id.  The Pope cautions that 
even a State motivated by good intentions in providing for the basic needs of its 
citizens can become an undesirable behemoth.  In a re-emphasis of the importance 
of community-based responses to individual need, Centesimus prefers voluntary 
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protect the right of workers to respond collectively to workplace 
conditions.  The distinction is a subtle one since it would be difficult 
for workers to exercise rights in the workplace without the state 
extending legal sanction to their activity.  It is desirable for the state 
to construct a legal regime supportive of worker-management 
cooperation, but undesirable for it to oversee the specific terms of 
every employment contract.  Throughout Catholic Social Thought 
there is a tension between the individual and the state.  While it is 
recognized that in some areas intimate state involvement may be 
essential to achieving social goals, there is a corresponding concern 
that the state may also become the sole agent in social life, thus 
minimizing the importance of the individual.  Integral to Catholic 
Social Thought’s philosophy of labor is the contribution of unions 
and other similar associations before government involvement, and 
the requirement that the state not work to undermine these groups.72 
E.  Unions/Workers’ Associations 
Common to Catholic Social Thought is the notion that social 
problems are best resolved using the resources of smaller, 
community-based organizations.73  This principle of subsidiarity74 
 
associations to a government bureaucracy when providing for the public welfare.  Id.  
For a comprehensive consideration of Catholic Social Thought and entitlements, see  
Symposium on Entitlements, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 419-793 (1997). 
 72 Rerum Novarum 38, supra note 18, at 33. 
 73 David L. Gregory, Dorothy Day’s Lessons for the Transformation of Work, 14 
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 57, 98-99 (1996). 
 74 From the Latin subsidium meaning “help,” subsidiarity is a central concept of 
Catholic Social Thought.  In one sense it is the cognate of “welfare” in the secular 
system.  Both ideas refer to the means by which a society provides temporary 
assistance to those in need.  Subsidiarity, however, acknowledges first that as an 
independent being vested with natural rights, man is endowed with the capacity for 
self-direction and autonomy.  See CATECHISM supra note 39, at § 1730.  Yet this 
independence does not call for man to live an insular existence, incapable of 
solidarity with others.  See CHARLES supra note 14, at 35.  Although individual self-
sufficiency is a requirement for the common good, solidarity with others mandates 
that as a society we assist “persons, families, and intermediate societies . . . when they 
need it.”  Id.  Dorothy Day, the social justice advocate, premised the mission of The 
Catholic Worker, an organization in service of the poor and oppressed, on subsidiarity: 
We advocate . . . [a] decentralized society in contrast to the present 
bigness of government, industry, education, health care, and 
agriculture.  We encourage efforts such as . . . worker ownership and 
management of small factories . . . any effort in which money can once 
more become merely a medium of exchange, and human beings are 
no longer commodities. 
Gregory, supra note 73, at 98. 
Wolfe makes a persuasive argument that subsidiarity is consonant with the 
American tradition of limited government.  See Christopher Wolfe, Subsidiarity: The 
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reflects the view that communities have a better understanding of 
their own deficiencies and therefore are more capable of effecting a 
just resolution than a larger, more bureaucratic entity.75  The 
community is large enough to exercise coercive power over members 
not acting to promote the common good, yet small enough to instill 
virtuous habits in its individual members.76  The State, on the other 
 
“Other” Ground of Limited Government, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND 
COMMUNITARIANISM 81 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995).  Unlike the American 
notion of limited government, however, subsidiarity is not based on a fear that 
“higher political authorities will abuse their power.”  Id. at 87.  Wolfe suggests that 
the theoretical foundation for subsidiarity is “deeper” and “more principled”—it 
reflects the Church’s teaching that people, not things, are the fundamental building 
blocks of society.  Id.  Therefore, people acting for the common good, not a 
bureaucratic entity, should bear the responsibility for the needy in their midst. 
 75 See Gregory Baum, Liberal Capitalism, in THE LOGIC OF SOLIDARITY 80 (Gregory 
Baum & Robert Ellsberg eds., 1989) (positing that subsidiarity seeks “a balance 
between the freedom of small enterprises and the government’s responsibility for the 
well-being of all”). 
 76 Communities are premised on a conception of the common good; that is, what 
is in the best interest of the group.  See YVES R. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF 
AUTHORITY 31-32 (1962).  In a symbiotic manner, the individual contributes to the 
health of the community and the community enables man to flourish in his social 
capacity. See Michael Novak, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 32 (1989) 
(proposing that the apparent tension between the individual and the community is 
often slight since they are not fundamentally contradictory: “When a human person 
acts with reflection and choice – acts, that is, as a person – the personal good and the 
common good tend to coincide”).  An important aspect of community is the 
individual members’ adherence to agreed-upon norms of conduct.  A serious 
challenge to the concept of community, therefore, is one branch of modern liberal 
political theory that views community as a collection of discrete persons pursuing 
their individual ends with minimal state interference in these personally-determined 
priorities.  See Kenneth L. Grasso, Beyond Liberalism: Human Dignity, the Free Society, and 
the Second Vatican Council, in CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM 45-46 
(Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995).  But see MARITAIN, supra note 47, at 49-51 
(proposing that the goal of society can be neither the satisfaction of individual good 
nor the satisfaction of the collection of individual goods, as discussed above).  
Maritain posits that both of these proposals would be destructive of society, since it 
would result in an “anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in which the 
whole function of the city is to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving to the strong 
full freedom to oppress the weak.” Id. at 50.  Rather, he suggests, the “common good 
of [society] is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a 
whole which . . . relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. Id. at 50-
51.  It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their 
communion in good living.  It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts . . . 
.”  Id. at 50.  Maritain’s words are in direct opposition to the modern individualist 
conception of society.  Grasso, supra note 76, at 45.  A related concern and a vexing 
difficulty with theories of community in general is the justification of coercion over 
individuals to encourage ethical behavior; that is, conduct promoting the good of the 
whole.  The proper exercise of authority in political associations receives early 
treatment by Aristotle in Book 3 of THE POLITICS.  The issue persists in the present 
day among political theorists.  See ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 150-52 
(discussing a community’s need to explicitly distinguish virtues from vices in order to 
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hand, is relatively aloof from the lives of the people.77  As a result of 
this distance, it is unable to appreciate fully the life of the community 
and so less suited to forging solutions tailored to the unique 
circumstances of those people.78  Catholic Social Thought does not 
deny that the State may attempt in good faith to rectify social ills in a 
particular community, but it prefers a response from the affected 
community.  Such local responses have normative force and thus are 
more likely to be sustainable.  There is less assurance that the State’s 
response will have the same legitimacy among individuals in the 
community.  In addition, the State exercises extensive coercive power 
while remaining virtually incapable of instilling virtuous habits in the 
citizenry.79  When the State remedies a situation, it essentially imposes 
a solution, thus denying those affected a meaningful role in crafting 
 
determine what actions are destructive of community.  In this way the community 
establishes moral and ethical norms, thus justifying coercive action over individuals 
not acting in the common good).  See also the classic study of the nature of coercion 
in political society in YVES R. SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AUTHORITY (1962).  The 
labor union may also be viewed as a community established to achieve a common 
objective and maintain rules of conduct for individual members.  Like political 
communities, unions embody the tension between individual self-fulfillment and 
community well-being.  The marked rise of individualism, scholars argue, is related 
to the decline in American civic organizations such as churches, political clubs, and 
neighborhoods.  See, e.g., Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions As Seedbeds of 
the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 290-91 (1995).  The decline in unionism can also 
be traced to the prevailing individualist sentiment.  See Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The 
Significance of Worker Attitudes: Individualism As a Cause For Labor’s Decline, 16 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 133, 134 (1998) (noting that “Americans are not attracted to 
unionization because they are increasingly inhospitable to collective action.  
Individualism has come to dominate American social structure and thought.  The 
traditional labor organization is based on an opposing ideology of mutual aid and 
support, in which individual interests yield to group interests . . . .”). 
 77 HENRY TAM, COMMUNITARIANISM 144 (1988) (describing the alienation of 
individuals engendered by modern political systems: “Conventional politics . . . take 
the marginalization of citizens for granted.  Political decisions are taken by the state, 
and the citizens are at best given a periodic vote . . . .”). 
 78 Id. at 156 (arguing that communitarian forms of governance prevent political 
decisions that are ill-suited to local needs by “avoiding the imposition of 
authoritarian visions”).  Communitarianism thus calls for more decentralized forms 
of government.  Id. at 157. 
 79 As Kenneth L. Grasso has noted, modern liberalism may be the political system 
least able to organize society around a conception of the common good. Grasso, 
supra note 76, at 46 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995).  The concept of subjective 
preference, which is fundamental to liberalism, prohibits any “substantive 
conception of the good life.”  Id. at 45.  Because such a conception would be simply 
one “subjective preference” among others, liberalism would be loathe to value one 
preference over another.  Id.  Rather than articulate a conception of the human 
good for all, liberalism allows each person to determine subjectively his own private 
good.  Id. at 46.  The coercive power of the state, therefore, operates only to ensure 
that each person remains free to pursue his own private good.  Id. 
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an alternative resolution.80  The proper role of the State is to protect 
its citizens and ensure that a just social order, defined by the people, 
is maintained.81 
Similarly, in the relationship between employer and employee, 
State interference should be kept to a minimum.82  Disagreements 
that arise—hours of work, working conditions, wages—should be 
resolved at the level of employer/employee through those smaller 
organizations representing the interests of both groups.83  Just as 
human beings naturally form families and communities to meet their 
various physical, emotional, and spiritual needs, workers form 
associations of people engaged in similar trades to meet their needs.84  
Workers’ associations, or unions, are fundamental not only to 
securing rights for working people, but also to the flourishing of 
culture and advancement of knowledge.85  This is so because, 
inevitably, human beings accomplish more as societies than they do 
as individuals.86  Individuals have a “natural right” to associate in 
groups,87 and the same principle that causes men to form a civil 
society also causes them to form unions.88  Therefore, if the State 
prohibits workers from forming unions, “it contradicts the very 
principle of its own existence; for both [a union] and the State exist 
in virtue of the same principle, viz., the natural propensity of man to 
live in society.”89 
An interesting question is raised, however, when the State does 
not actively prohibit collective action by workers, but simply does not 
substantiate it.  In other words, does the State have an affirmative 
 
 80 TAM, supra note 77, at 144. 
 81 Rerum Novarum 26, supra note 18, at 26. 
 82 Id. at 34, at 31. 
 83 Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380. 
 84 Id. at 36. 
 85 Id. 
 86 MARITAIN, supra note 47, at 48 (“[The person seeks to live in society because] 
unless it is integrated in a body of social communications, it cannot attain the 
fullness of its life and accomplishment . . . .  It is not by itself alone that it reaches its 
plenitude but by receiving essential goods from society.”). 
 87 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 6 (Carnes Lord ed., 1984). 
 88 Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. 
REV. 727, 730-33 (positing that collective bargaining arises directly out of the classical 
notion that “the primary function of community is to assist the full development and 
proper unfolding of the human personality . . . .”). 
 89 Id.  The notion of man as a social being naturally drawn to community-
building and acting in concert with others for better living was first meaningfully 
articulated by Aristotle and strongly emphasized in the political theory of Aquinas, 
the philosopher credited with providing the intellectual and theological foundation 
for Catholic Social Thought. 
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duty to promote unions?  While the State may not be morally 
obligated to advocate union activity, it should be careful that its 
neutrality does not effectively hinder such activity either.  In this 
regard, Part II.B addresses how the joint employer doctrine has 
served to deny contingent employees the rights of representation 
contemplated by the National Labor Relations Act. 
F.  Laborem Exercens and the Philosophy of Work 
In 1981, ninety years after the release of Rerum Novarum, John 
Paul II thoroughly reviewed the Catholic theory of labor and added 
his own insights to labor in the postmodern world in the encyclical 
Laborem Exercens (On Human Work).90  Laborem Exercens represents an 
exploration into the nature of work that is more subtle and 
theological than Rerum Novarum.  It recognizes that work in the 
modern world plays an even more prominent role than it once did.  
It is not enough, John Paul argues, to view work as a necessary evil 
and merely ensure that a decent wage and satisfactory working 
conditions prevail.91  Laborem Exercens creates a “gospel of work,” 
giving human toil a theological significance and a vital role in the 
self-realization of the human person.92  The Church acknowledges 
that as human civilizations and cultures have progressed, the notion 
of work has also evolved.93  There is an urgent need “for the discovery 
of the new meanings of human work.”94  More specifically, it must be 
determined whether the legal and social structures we use to define 
work promote just relationships between individuals and therefore 
harmony among the various social strata.95 
Work is a profound dimension in the life of an individual.96  It 
occupies a significant portion of our daily lives, it defines our 
“station” in society, and it is largely determinative of the lifestyle we 
choose to adopt.97  In Catholic Social Thought, work derives its 
 
 90 Laborem Exercens, supra note 33, at 352. 
 91 Early in the encyclical, John Paul describes work as “the key to the social 
question” and asserts that the nature of human work is an important aspect of 
“making life more human.”  Id. at 3, at 355.  Work is invested with a deeply 
theological significance.  Id. 
 92 Id. at 25, at 386. 
 93 Id. at 2, at 353-54. 
 94 Id. at 354. 
 95 Id. at 1, at 353. 
 96 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 65-66 (1985) (arguing that at 
its deepest, work is morally inseparable from one’s life.  “It subsumes the self into a 
community of disciplined practice and sound judgment whose activity has meaning 
and value in itself . . . .”). 
 97 Id. 
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profundity from Biblical sources.98  After all, the very existence of 
creation is a result of God’s “labor” over a six-day period.99  Following 
the creation of human beings, God passed along responsibility for 
further creation in his admonition that humanity is to “fill the earth 
and subdue it.”100  In one sense, then, Genesis is essentially about the 
divine mandate for man to be active in the world, to transform nature 
through his work into a place reflective of God’s will.101  This is a 
direct call, therefore, for a culture of work that enhances human 
dignity, strives for a just social order, and places a concern for man’s 
well-being at the center of the process.  In other words, it is focused 
on the worker, not on the end result of work. 
Laborem Exercens elaborates on a theory of work that emphasizes 
two fundamental dimensions: objective and subjective.102  Work is 
defined as a “transitive” activity, which indicates that an act of labor 
starts with the human subject and ends with the desired effect on an 
object.103  This distinction assumes vital significance because, as the 
creation of God vested with supreme importance, man as the subject 
of work is the measuring stick against which any labor theory is 
measured.104  The effect which any employment law or practice has on 
the objective aspect of work, namely profits, is of secondary 
 
 98 HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 39. 
 99 Genesis, 1:1-31. 
 100 Laborem Exercens 4, supra note 33, at 356. 
 101 HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 41. 
 102 Laborem Exercens, supra note 5, at 357-60. 
 103 Id. at 4, at 356. 
 104 As Neuhaus observes, man as the measure of theory is a common theme in 
John Paul II’s writings, particularly in Centesimus Annus.  RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, 
DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: THE CHALLENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALIST 182 
(1992).  Since his days as a student of Edmund Husserl, John Paul adhered to the 
teaching of phenomenology, “a philosophy that is determined to attend not so much 
to grand principles as to the structures and patterns of behavior by which people 
think and act.”  Id. at 181-82.  Phenomenology is a realist philosophy in the sense 
that it places man in historical time with all his imperfections and shortcomings.  Id. 
at 182.  Perhaps in response to his own experiences under Communism in Poland, 
John Paul II’s thought opposes the socialist objectification of man and resists its 
reduction of man from individual to mere instrument of the State.  Id.  With the 
encyclicals of John Paul II, injected into Catholic thought is a vibrant philosophy of 
“person as actor.”  Id.  There is a renewed emphasis on “man as subject;” no longer is 
he the passive object of action, but the creative initiator.  Man’s conscious perception 
of his environment becomes important because he is not a cog in the machine.  As 
the being vested with the highest dignity and intelligence, he is called to a life of 
intimate participation with God in the world of creation.  HOLLENBACH, supra note 
33, at 41.  Therefore man as subject must not be alienated from this creative process 
of work, but feel integrated with it.  As work assumes an ever greater role in our 
society, it may be that labor theory and employment practices will provide the most 
significant opportunity to build a more human way of life. 
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importance.105 
G.  Objective Nature of Work 
The objective element of work is the technology used to 
accomplish the task and the products that result.106  It is the process 
through which nature is transformed to meet the needs of 
humanity.107  Man applies his intellectual and physical powers, for 
example, to devise ways of turning resources into productive sources 
of energy, food, or clothing.  This may involve processes of growing 
plants, extracting minerals, or altering natural resources through the 
manufacturing process into items useful to human consumption.108  
Throughout history these processes have become less labor-intensive 
because sophisticated technology in the form of machines now 
accomplishes many of the tasks once performed by human workers.109  
The danger in this continued refinement of the objective aspect of 
work is that man becomes an increasingly insignificant factor in the 
calculus of labor, technology, and productivity.110  Even the current 
economy’s increased emphasis on human capital has not rendered 
these concerns obsolete.  The rise of the employee-driven service 
economy has not necessarily resulted in increased job security or 
worker contentment.  This danger did not end with the Industrial 
Revolution, but remains with us as technology and work generally 
have become even more sophisticated.111  John Paul II suggests that in 
light of the dramatic changes in the post-industrial environment, 
there is a need once again for “reproposing in new ways the question 
 
 105 HOLLENBACH, supra note 33, at 38. 
 106 Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 357. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 This phenomenon of the “displaced worker” is one of the most contentious 
issues in labor law.  Technological change and its accompanying efficiency often 
eliminate jobs. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 
169-70 (1984).  The response of organized labor to high-tech advances in the 
workplace has been varied.  Id.  Acknowledging that this may be perceived as against 
social progress, some unions support the continuing evolution of the workplace.  Id.  
The difficulty arises, however, as unions attempt to support such changes while 
vigorously advocating job protection for their members.  Id. 
 110 Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 357. 
 111 For a contemporary illustration of how increasing technological sophistication 
continues to adversely affect the wages and conditions of workers, see Organizing 
High-Tech Permatemps in the Pacific Northwest: Interview with Barbara Judd, 4 
WORKINGUSA 100, 100-13 (2000-2001) (discussing the formation of WashTech, an 
association formed to organize workers employed in the technology industry of 
Washington State). 
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of human work.”112  This consideration suggests the restoration of 
man, particularly in this age of mechanization, as “the proper subject 
of work.”113 
H.  Subjective Nature of Work 
The subjective element of work is concerned with man’s action 
as he engages in the work process and what meaning work has for the 
person doing it.114  Beyond the objective results achieved by these 
actions (“finishing the job”), a subjective view of work requires that in 
doing his job, man’s actions help him “to realize his humanity.”115  
Work is deeply related to the essential process of self-realization, 
whereby an individual becomes conscious of his freedom, his 
rationality, and his capacity for volition.116  Remarkably, it holds that 
man has a right to expect his work to be fulfilling in the deepest 
sense.117 
Laborem Exercens specifically outlines what is necessary for the 
individual to achieve this important subjective satisfaction in the 
workplace.118  John Paul II cautions from the outset that an employee 
is not only concerned with the salary he receives for the work he 
performs.119  The employee needs more than simply remuneration.  
Most importantly, a worker needs to feel a sense of ownership; that is, 
he must at some level truly believe that he is working “for himself.”120  
 
 112 Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 357. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Neuhaus captures the meaning of “subjectivity” well.  NEUHAUS, supra note 104, 
at 24.  He argues that a theory taking into account the subjective nature of the 
human person is one that fits ideas to man and not vice versa: “[O]ur thinking about 
economics must attend to real, concrete human beings and how they behave.  Not 
just how we think they should behave, but how they actually do behave.  Real people 
do not easily fit into the procrustean beds of grand theories . . . .  The ‘subjectivity of 
society’ means that we start by taking people where they are and as they are.”  Id. 
 115 Laborem Exercens 6, supra note 33, at 358. 
 116 The notion that man possesses a deep inclination to understand his own 
human nature and his particular self does not, of course, originate in Christian 
philosophy.  As Nozick notes in his discussion of self-identity, the admonition that 
humanity engage in a process of introspection appears in philosophical and religious 
systems worldwide.  ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 27 (1981).  From 
the oracle at Delphi’s charge of  “know thyself” to the yogic emphasis on uncovering 
our true natures, there has always been a human need for self-knowledge.  Id. 
 117 Laborem Exercens 6, supra note 33, at 359. 
 118 Id. at 15, at 373. 
 119 Id. 
 120 The idea that a worker needs to feel a sense of ownership echoes the concept 
of “alienated labor” familiar in the work of Marx.  Marx expounded two distinct 
forms of alienation confronting the worker.  The first is his estrangement from the 
product of his labor.  MARX, supra note 25, at 324.  The idea is that there is a 
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For many employees this is difficult to achieve since often they are 
not the owners of their work product, much less the business itself.  
Absent this sense of self-direction, an employee feels anomie, a 
disconnectedness from the work in which he participates.121  Catholic 
teaching discourages “excessive bureaucratic centralization” because 
it suggests to employees that they are just parts of the production 
process, indistinguishable from the machines they operate.122 
From this conception of man as the subject and focus of work 
derives a body of defined rights of workers.123  In order to achieve the 
goals of self-realization and dignity in the workplace, employees are 
entitled to certain benefits and conditions.124 
In terms of the employer and his employee, an employer has an 
obligation to provide unemployment benefits to those who have lost 
their jobs.125  The basis for this benefit is each person’s right to “life 
and subsistence.”126  It is a moral imperative that the larger 
community provide for others in its midst who are in temporary need 
of assistance.127  For those who are employed, an employer must 
provide a just wage.128  As Leo XIII first stipulated in Rerum Novarum, a 
just wage is not necessarily what the employer and his employee 
 
cognitive dissonance between the worker and the product of his labor.  Id.  The 
product is the embodiment of his labor, yet he feels alienated from it.  Id.  The 
second is his estrangement from the work process itself.  Id. at 326.  The act of 
working somehow estranges the worker from himself.  Id.  In Marx’s view, “The 
estrangement of the object of labor merely summarizes the estrangement, the 
alienation in the activity of labor itself.”  Id.  at 324-26. 
 121 ERICH FROMM, MARX’S CONCEPT OF MAN 44 (1961). 
 122 Laborem Exercens 15, supra note 33, at 373. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 18, at 376. 
 126 Id. at 18, at 377. 
 127 This is derived from the notion of the common good.  Maritain explained this 
duty as inherent to the nature of social man.  It distinguishes the individual from 
society and explains how man seeks individual self-fulfillment and in the process 
finds himself serving the common good of the community: 
The person as person insists on serving the community and the 
common good freely.  It insists on this while tending toward its own 
fullness, while transcending itself and the community in its movement 
toward the transcendent Whole.  The person as an individual is 
necessarily bound, by constraint if need be, to serve the community 
and the common good since it is excelled by them as the part by the 
whole. 
MARITAIN, supra note 47, at 77. 
 128 “Just wage” theory has a long tradition in Catholic Social Thought beginning 
with Rerum Novarum.  For an excellent exposition of just wage theory in the years 
immediately following Rerum Novarum in the United States, see the classic JOHN A. 
RYAN, A LIVING WAGE (Macmillan 1912). 
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establish by contract.129  For an employee with family responsibilities, 
an acceptable wage is that which allows the needs of the entire family 
to be met without the other spouse having to work.130  In addition, 
justice requires that workers have convenient access to health care 
(either provided by the State or by the employer) and that this service 
be easily affordable or free.131  In a related manner, employees have a 
right to a pension as well as insurance during old age.132  Each of 
these enumerated rights is intimately related to the labor union, 
which functions to gain these rights and also to maintain them once 
they are obtained.133 
Catholic Social Thought upholds the right of workers to form 
associations by profession in order to promote their respective 
interest both in the workplace and in private life.134  Laborem Exercens 
recognizes that unions often occupy an adversarial role as 
organizations directly opposed to the interests of managers and 
owners.135  But Catholic Social Thought rejects the notion of struggle 
between classes that gave rise to the unions of industrialized nations 
and instead envisions unions as entities with a unifying mission of 
building community.136  Unions legitimately represent the interests of 
workers, but they are not engaged in “struggle” for its own sake.137  
Rather, they are vehicles by which workers gain a voice in the 
employment context and contribute to a constructive dialogue with 
employers.138 
 
 129 Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31. 
 130 Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 220. 
 131 Id. at 218 (noting how in Catholic Social Thought the just wage allows a person 
to live in human dignity.  Consistent in the encyclicals is the assertion that the wage 
must promote more than mere survival.  Benefits such as health care and pensions 
therefore are firmly rooted in the just wage tradition.). 
 132 Laborem Exercens 19, supra note 33, at 380. 
 133 Americans who join labor unions do so for traditional economic reasons 
(higher wages, comprehensive benefits), not because they view the union as a means 
of participating more meaningfully in the work process.  See Margalioth supra note 
76, at 145-46. The dramatic decline in the American labor union seems to suggest 
that workers do not see unions as integral to the achievement of better working 
conditions.  Yet in recent times the trend appears to be reversing, particularly among 
professionals, a group traditionally not attracted to unionization. 
 134 Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380-82. 
 135 Id. at 20, at 380. 
 136 Rerum Novarum 15, supra note 18, at 20. 
 137 Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380. 
 138 Id.  The distinction between employees and independent contractors depends 
essentially on the degree of control exercised by the employer.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2. In the traditional language of the Restatement, an 
employee is “an agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose 
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the 
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II:  LEGAL BACKGROUND AND VIZCAINO V. MICROSOFT 
Under traditional employment law principles, there is a 
presumption in favor of the employer-employee relationship.139  As 
Gregory and Leder have observed, the bulk of existing case law 
reflects the suspicion with which courts have viewed the employer 
who attempts to characterize his staff as “independent contractors” 
rather than “employees.”140  Yet despite this presumption, courts have 
also looked to the employment contract to determine the rights and 
obligations governing the relationship.141  Some courts have relied on 
the words of the contract to uphold the employer’s designations of 
the worker as an independent contractor, thus denying these people 
benefits accorded to similarly situated colleagues whom the employer 
has classified as “employees.”142  In a marked departure from many of 
its sister circuits, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation refused to rely solely 
on the terminology in the contract to determine the plaintiffs’ proper 
classification.143  Instead the court utilized the common law employee 
doctrine with its traditional analysis of employer control to find the 
plaintiffs eligible for benefits.144 
In Vizcaino, the Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) established 
two classes of workers.145  The first class was comprised of its “regular 
 
right to control by the master.”  Id. § 2(2).  The independent contractor, in contrast, 
is “a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not 
controlled by the other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his 
physical conduct in the performance of his undertaking.”  Id. § 2(3).  This 
distinction is crucial in cases involving an employer’s potential liability to third 
parties for injuries caused by an agent.  Under principles of respondeat superior, an 
employer may be held vicariously liable for the torts committed by those in her 
employ.  Id. at § 219.  As a general rule, the employer is not liable for employees’ 
tortious conduct outside of the scope of their employment.  Id. § 219(2).  
Consequently, the employer may avert liability if she proves that the tortfeasor was an 
independent contractor and therefore beyond her control. 
 139 David L. Gregory & William T. Leder, Employee or Independent Contractor? 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation, 47 LAB. L.J. 749 (1996). 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank, 102 F.3d 1435, 1439-40 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to participate in stock ownership plan 
because each had signed an agreement designating them independent contractors). 
 142 See Sprague v. GM Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (denying plaintiffs 
entitlement to benefits because of contractual agreements). 
 143 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’d en banc, 120 F.3d 1006 (1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 1098 (1998). 
 144 Id. at 1195, 1200. Thus, in Vizcaino the Ninth Circuit expanded the common 
law employee doctrine beyond the tort context to justify the extension of health 
benefits etc. to affected employees. 
 145 Id. at 1189-90. 
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employees” who were considered the permanent core of the 
company’s staff.146  To these employees Microsoft extended paid 
vacations, sick leave, holidays, short-term disability, group health and 
life insurance, pensions, savings benefits under its Savings Plus Plan, 
and stock options under its Employee Stock Purchase Plan.147  The 
second class was comprised of temporary agency employees who were 
“fully integrated into [its] workforce” and often performed tasks 
identical to those of the permanent employees.148  These “temps” 
were entitled to none of the fringe benefits that the regular 
employees enjoyed.149  The temps freely contracted with Microsoft to 
work as freelancers and from the inception of their employment 
knew they were not entitled to benefits.150  The company informed 
the temps that they were responsible for all taxes, insurance, and 
benefits.151  Subsequently an IRS audit concluded that under the 
common law the freelancers were employees, and so Microsoft would 
have to pay employment taxes and its portion of Federal Insurance 
Contribution Act (FICA) tax.152  The IRS reasoned that because 
“Microsoft either exercised, or retained the right to exercise, 
direction over the services performed,” it was required to pay the 
corresponding “employee” taxes.153  As a result of this ruling, the 
plaintiffs contended that the common law employee doctrine also 
entitled them to the benefits Microsoft had denied them by 
contract.154 
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial 
of benefits and remanded the case for determination of individual 
elegibility for benefits.155  Most significantly, the court stipulated that 
employment status is not controlled by the label assigned to workers 
in their contract.156  In addition, the court rejected Microsoft’s 
contention that by treating its temps differently (assigning them 
distinct I.D. badges and e-mail addresses, providing them with a less 
formal orientation, not inviting them to official company functions, 
not paying overtime wages, and paying them through accounts 
 
 146 Id. at 1189. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1190. 
 149 Vizcaino, 97 F.3d  at 1189. 
 150 Id. at 1190. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 1190-91. 
 153 Vizcaino, 97 F.3d  at 1191. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 1200. 
 156 Id. at 1195. 
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receivable rather than payroll),157 the company was clearly separating 
its classes of employees for purposes of benefits.158  The Ninth Circuit 
sent a clear message that contractual language and superficial 
distinctions among employees would not suffice to classify some as 
independent contractors and deny them employee benefits.159 
Vizcaino sparked considerable controversy on both sides of the 
issue.  One view wholly rejects the Ninth Circuit’s allowance of 
common law employee considerations to affect the classification of 
employees.160  This theory embraces laissez-faire market capitalism and 
necessarily views the Vizcaino decision as a threat to the integrity of 
contract and the freedom of autonomous actors to direct their lives 
in their own self-interest.161  Its proponents view the Vizcaino court’s 
approach as tantamount to ignoring the parties’ intentions and, in 
the process, undermining principles of contract.162  This view argues 
that courts should not presume to understand the customs of the 
industry in which these arrangements are made.163  For example, the 
computer industry is unpredictable and companies rely on 
independent contractors both to easily fill needs as they arise and to 
reduce staff as required.164  From this angle, the court interfered with 
the efficient market response to fluctuating demand.165 
For the practitioner advising an employer-client, Vizcaino 
suggests that the law on independent contractors is sufficiently in a 
state of flux such that employers need to be careful in classifying their 
staff.166  It is suggested that Vizcaino is a dramatic example of a 
growing trend by “courts and administrative agencies . . . to prevent 
employers classifying workers so as to avoid legal liabilities and 
 
 157 Id. at 1190. 
 158 Vizcaino, 97 F.3d  at 1195, n.9. 
 159 Id. at 1195: 
We have no doubt that the company did not intend to provide 
freelancers or independent contractors with employee benefits, and 
that if the plaintiffs had in fact been freelancers or independent 
contractors, they would not be eligible under the plan.  The plaintiffs, 
however, were not freelancers or independent contractors.  They were 
common law employees . . . . 
 160 See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 161 Kellogg, supra note 2, at 1779 (noting that “the Ninth Circuit showed a 
disturbing eagerness to recast the employment relationship from the beginning . . . .  
The Ninth Circuit ignored contractual agreements to the contrary.”). 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 1802. 
 165 Id. at 1802-03. 
 166 Coskey, supra note 5, at 91. 
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responsibilities.”167  The employer is cautioned to avoid the 
retroactive financial burdens of having a court determine that its staff 
are common law employees.168  As Microsoft did following the Vizcaino 
ruling, employers often resort to hiring freelance employees through 
temp agencies.169  The agency then becomes responsible for payroll 
services and withholding of federal taxes.170  It is not clear whether in 
doing so the employer protects itself from liability under other 
employment laws.171  At the very least it is reasonable to expect that 
employers after Vizcaino will take two courses of action: hire from 
temporary agencies and take even stronger steps to distinguish 
workers for whom they will provide benefits and those for whom they 
will not.  Each of these practices has dramatically impacted the 
workplace and employment law. 
A.  The Temp Agency as a Means of Reducing Control 
Employers utilize temp agencies in an attempt to lessen their 
degree of control over certain employees and thereby avoid certain 
legal obligations.172  These agencies assume a significant portion of 
the obligations formerly carried out by the on-site employer, such as 
payment of salary, withholding of taxes, and other duties mandated 
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).173  By transferring these 
responsibilities to the temporary employment agency, the user 
employer essentially designates the agency as the “employer” and 
thereby avoids the serious financial liabilities associated with having a 
court determine that the contingent workforce are common law 
employees.174  Such a  legal arrangement, however, is premised on an 
instrumental conception of the employee.  The employee is 
 
 167 Id. at 92. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Gregory & Leder, supra note 139, at 753. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id.  For example, what is the employer’s obligation in terms of workers’ 
compensation, the NLRA, anti-discrimination laws, and FMLA provisions? 
 172 As George Gonos has noted, the employer’s use of the temp agency: 
effectively severs the employer-employee relationship between workers 
and those user-firms on whose premises they work and for whom they 
provide needed labor input.  That is, this arrangement allows the 
[temporary help firm’s] client to utilize labor without taking on the 
specific social, legal, and contractual obligations that since the New 
Deal have been attached to employer status . . . . 
 Professor George Gonos, The Battle Over ‘Employer’ Status in the Post-War U.S. : The Case 
of the Temporary Help Firm, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society 
Association 6 (June 1995) (on file with author). 
 173 Id. at 8. 
 174 Coskey, supra note 5, at 96. 
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indistinguishable from production capital and ought to be 
manipulated to meet narrow business goals: greater productivity and 
lesser costs.175  There is little, if any, consideration of the resulting 
adverse consequences to the temporary employees.176  These 
consequences range from the employee feeling that he is expendable 
and not integral to the job, to the arbitrary denial of employment 
benefits to contingent workers who do exactly the same work as their 
permanent colleagues.177  Recent developments in employment law, 
however, strongly suggest that employers may find it more difficult to 
use the temp agency artifice to sidestep the issue of contingent 
workers’ rights.178 
B.  Joint Employer Doctrine and Evolving Rights of Temporary 
Employees 
As discussed above, when a user-employer hires its non-
permanent staff from a temporary agency, it attempts to assign 
“employer” status to the agency.179  In addition to avoiding certain 
financial obligations, the employer also endeavors to circumvent the 
concomitant obligation to collectively bargain with its staff.180  In the 
 
 175 Ness, supra note 1, at 4. 
 176 Even the language used by management representatives reflects a purely 
rational, business-model approach to the utilization of labor.  In a recent report from 
the American Management Association, a representative of that organization used 
this familiar jargon to advise companies on making productive use of the contingent 
worker tool: 
[t]hese [Staffing and Structure] surveys show us the importance of 
approaching staffing issues from a strategic viewpoint.  As companies try 
harder and harder to reap efficiencies and competitive advantage from 
their organizational structures the sophisticated and strategic use of a 
variety of staffing solutions, from temporary workers and outsourcing, 
to full-time hires, will become essential.  Companies should be 
schooled and ready to capitalize on the variety of options at their 
disposal. 
Need for Talent and Flexibility, Not Cost Savings, Drive Hiring of Contingent Workers, AMA 
UPDATE (Am. Mgmt. Ass’n., New York, N.Y.), July 18, 2000, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 177 For a general account of this phenomenon and the efforts of temp advocates 
to institute concrete changes in the temp industry’s employment practices, see 
Bernstein, supra note 13, at 102.  One specific measure is a code of conduct 
governing the temporary agencies’ practices.  The code would require, among other 
things, that temps receive adequate training for their assignments.  Id. at 102-03.  It 
would also encourage companies to convert temps into permanent employees by 
abolishing the fee typically paid by the hiring company for such conversions.  Id. at 
103. 
 178 See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra note 155. 
 180 Richard Posthuma & James B. Dworkin, The Joint Employer, the NLRB, and 
Changing Rights for Contingent Workers, 90 LAB. L.J. 19, 20 (1997). 
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context of the contingent workforce, this added advantage ensures 
that the user-employer will not have to formally negotiate with 
workers over the inevitable wage and benefit grievances that will 
arise.181 
Under the joint employer doctrine, however, the law provides 
that an employee may have two employers for collective bargaining 
purposes.182  Joint employers are “two or more clearly distinct firms 
that share the authority to determine the terms and conditions of 
employment of specified employees.  The firms do not have to be 
jointly owned, operated, or controlled to be designated joint 
employers.”183  This has the potential, of course, to expand contingent 
workers’ rights of representation under traditional labor law.  The 
user–employer, therefore, may be considered a joint employer with 
the temporary employment agency if “there are sufficient facts to 
show that one employer essentially controls the labor relations of 
another.”184  This returns us to a control analysis similar to the one 
ratified by the Vizcaino court to find that the plaintiffs were employees 
entitled to benefits.185  In other words, despite the involvement of the 
temporary employment agency, the question is whether the user– 
employer still exercises control over the employees in the workplace 
sufficient to make it a joint employer.  As a joint employer, the 
company would not be permitted to sever its legal bonds 
completely.186  Its power to make unilateral decisions regarding 
employment conditions would be significantly reduced if collective 
bargaining duties are imposed.187  Notwithstanding evidence of 
control, until recently the employer could still avoid collective 
 
 181 Thus the already tenuous connection between the contingent worker and his 
work environment is compounded by the law’s protection of the employer’s right to 
refuse to engage in constructive dialogue with the temporary staff.  Prior to August 
2000, the NLRB did not extend collective bargaining rights under the NLRA to any 
class of temporary worker.  See Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Winning Union 
Representation for Temps, 4 WORKINGUSA 37, 38-39 (2000-01).  The alienation of the 
temporary worker, therefore, has a two-fold source: the first is the measures taken by 
the employer to separate out the temp so as to avoid the adverse consequences of a 
court’s finding of control.  The second is the legal barriers denying the temp the 
right to assume a more active role in the workplace culture. 
 182 Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 20. 
 183 Id. (distinguishing the joint employer doctrine from the single employer and 
alter ego doctrine). 
 184 Id. 
 185 Vizcaino, supra note 143, at 1191-92. 
 186 Specifically, the user-employer would have to bargain over a contract 
termination with the temp agency.  The employer may also be subject to laws 
governing unfair labor practices.  Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 23. 
 187 Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 23. 
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bargaining with his temporary employees under the NLRA.188 
The joint employer doctrine requires not only that the element 
of control be satisfied, but also that the employer consents to collective 
bargaining with the employees of a temporary agency.189  This 
requirement, commonly referred to as the Greenhoot consent rule, 
rendered virtually irrelevant the finding of control by the employer 
over the temporary employees.190  Greenhoot assured the employer 
that, simply by withholding its consent, it could avoid answering for 
its employment practices at the bargaining table.191  This aided in 
maintaining the adversarial paradigm that has traditionally 
characterized the employer/employee relationship.192  Recognizing 
that the Greenhoot consent rule may be denying contingent workers 
the representation rights contemplated by the NLRA, the NLRB 
revisited the rule recently in M.B. Sturgis, Inc.193 
In M.B. Sturgis, the Board significantly refined Greenhoot to allow 
temporary workers who are jointly employed to form a bargaining 
unit with permanent employees without the consent of the 
employers.194  The Board first noted that under Section 9(b) of the 
NLRA, it had the authority to examine novel employment 
arrangements to ensure that employees had the “fullest freedom in 
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act.”195  M.B. Sturgis 
employed thirty-four to thirty-five permanent employees and ten to 
 
 188 The recently decided case M.B. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B 440 (2000), has 
significantly altered the potential bargaining rights of temporary workers. See infra 
note 207 and accompanying text. 
 189 Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250, 251 (1973) 
 190 Posthuma and Dworkin have astutely observed that the Greenhoot consent rule 
effectively denied contingent workers any substantive bargaining rights: 
The irony . . . is that the more control the user-employer exercises over 
the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of 
temporary workers, the greater the likelihood that it will be deemed a 
joint employer, and thus have the right to refuse to bargain with the 
temporary workers.  This situation has led some to conclude that 
temporary employees have virtually no protection under the NLRA. 
See supra note 180, at 22. 
 191 Id. at 23. 
 192 Theodore Eisenberg, The Price of Protection, 148 N.J. L.J. 117 (1997) (noting the 
need for organized labor to improve upon the adversarial model in order to facilitate 
management-labor cooperation). 
 193 M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 440 (2000) 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. at 448 (quoting the following from Section 9(b) of the NLRA.: “The Board 
shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest 
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the 
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or 
subdivision thereof.”). 
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fifteen temporary agency employees at its flexible gas hose 
manufacturing plant.196  Although the agency hired the temps, 
determined their wages and benefits, and paid them their salaries, 
the temps “work[ed] side-by-side with Sturgis’ employees, 
perform[ed] the same work, and were subject[ed] to the same 
supervision.”197  When the temporary employees sought to join the 
same collective bargaining unit as the Sturgis employees, the 
Regional Director of the NLRB excluded them, reasoning that since 
they were jointly employed, the consent of both employers was 
required to include the temporary employees.198  Since the agency 
had not given its consent, the temps’ inclusion in the bargaining unit 
was barred.199 
The Board reversed the decision on the ground that the 
requirement of consent under the joint employer doctrine was not 
proper in the M.B. Sturgis context.200  In the Board’s opinion, Section 
9(b) contemplates a bargaining unit consisting of “all of an 
employer’s employees or a subgroup of such employees.”201  
Furthermore, consent is not required for employees to gain 
representation in an employer-wide unit.202  The Board then 
determined that a bargaining unit consisting of regular and 
temporary employees must only meet the community of interest 
test.203  In applying the community of interest test, the Board opined 
that the test establishes “whether a mutuality of interests in wages, 
hours, and working conditions exists among the employees 
involved.”204  The test would likely be satisfied where employees 
worked together in the same environment, with identical supervisors, 
and under similar conditions.205  The Board ultimately decided that 
the contingent employees in M.B. Sturgis shared a community of 
interest with their permanent colleagues and did not need employer 
consent to join the bargaining unit.206 
The decision correctly recognized that the Greenhoot consent 
requirement needed to be reinterpreted in the case of contingent 
 
 196 Id. at 443. 
 197 Id. 
 198 M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. at 443. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at 448. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. at 449. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 453. 
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employment.  The consent requirement had become arbitrary in 
work environments where temporary employees were 
indistinguishable from permanent workers in terms of wages, 
functions, supervisors, and expectations.  With this modification of 
the consent rule, the employer’s bargaining obligations will be solely 
a function of whether the user-employer is a joint employer, thus 
making it easier for unions to organize temporary workers.207  The 
M.B. Sturgis decision, however, is not without its potentially negative 
ramifications, particularly employers’ decisions to terminate 
temporary positions rather than extend costly bargaining rights to 
those employees.208 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the issue of contingent 
workers is a complex one involving valid competing claims from both 
the employer and employee.  Each side presents its position as 
grounded in certain rights: for the employer, it is the right to 
contract for employees who are willing to fill a need for less total 
compensation; for the employee it is the right to earn a living wage 
and receive treatment equal to his permanent colleagues.209  The 
ultimate resolution to this question and the legal framework we 
subsequently adopt must not only satisfy sound legal principle, but 
must also be morally acceptable.  A morally justifiable regime is one 
that respects individual rights but also promotes human dignity.210  
Rights are not unqualified; they are not to be exercised without 
 
 207 Posthuma & Dworkin, supra note 180, at 26. 
 208 Id.  Posthuma and Dworkin argue that: 
[w]e may see employers reduce the control they exercise over 
temporary employees to insure that they do not expose themselves to a 
bargaining obligation as a joint employer.  User employers may be 
forced to carefully tailor their relationships with temp help agencies to 
show that they do not exercise control over the temp workers.  As they 
tailor their relationships to reduce control, they may also reduce their 
flexibility in handling temporary workers . . . This could mean that 
some user employers would reduce their reliance on temporary 
workers, and consequently reduce the number of temp jobs available. 
Id. 
 209 See Cook, supra note 11, at 16, quoting a representative of the American 
Staffing Association regarding employers’ rights in the contingent employment 
context: 
[e]mployers ought to be free to say ‘we’re going to provide coverage to 
this group of workers and not to that group of workers . . .’  Although it 
may strike some people as arbitrary or unfair, the law currently allows 
them to do that, for reasons that don’t have to be justified. 
 210 Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (Joy and Hope: Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World) (1965) 29, reprinted in The Documents of Vatican II 
228 (Walter M. Abbott S.J. ed. & Very Rev. Msgr. Joseph L. Gallagher trans., 1966) 
(acknowledging that while human institutions must “safeguard the basic rights of 
man,” they must also “minister to the dignity and purpose of man”). 
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regard for the common good.  What is in the best interest of society 
cannot be determined until we can ascertain what is in the best 
interest of man individually.211  Catholic Social Thought is very well-
situated to appraise the evolving social condition of man because it 
has developed over time a consistent philosophy of human nature 
and the kind of society that allows that nature to flourish.212 
III:  CONTINGENT EMPLOYMENT UNDER CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 
Underlying the issue of contingent work are competing theories 
of individualism213 and communitarianism.214  The individualist theory 
tends to frame the issue as an employment arrangement freely 
chosen by the parties and established in contract.215  Parties enter into 
contract to secure for themselves what they believe is an advantage of 
some sort.216  The State and its laws are not to interfere 
paternalistically with these arrangements, but to defend vigorously 
the rights of individuals to use the contract as a means of achieving 
their own personally-defined happiness.217  By contrast, the 
 
 211 Id. at 25, at 224 (noting that the human person is the focus of social life, and 
that all institutions exist to serve man). 
 212 Id. at 10, at 208 (“The Church believes that Christ . . . can through His Spirit 
offer man the light and the strength to measure up to his supreme destiny . . .  The 
Church also maintains that beneath all changes there are many realities which do 
not change . . . .”). 
 213 “Individualism” as used in this article refers to the ethos whereby citizens 
determine for themselves what the good life is and expect the law to “afford all 
lifestyles and belief systems equal treatment.”  See Kenneth L. Grasso, Introduction: 
Catholic Social Thought and the Quest for An American Public Philosophy, in CATHOLICISM, 
LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM 3 (Kenneth L. Grasso et al. eds., 1995) (“The 
state exists simply to make public arrangements designed to secure individuals the 
greatest possible amount of freedom to lead their lives in the way they choose 
consistent with the exercise of that freedom by others.”). 
 214 “Communitarianism” refers to precepts similar to those embodied in the 
Preamble to the Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, among 
which are the recognition “[o]f individual human dignity and the social dimension 
of human existence . . . that communities and politics have obligations . . . to foster 
participation and deliberation in social and political life, of the social side of human 
nature; the responsibilities that must be borne by citizens, individually and 
collectively, in a regime of rights . . . .”  See THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER 
xxv (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998). 
 215 Kellogg, supra note 2, at 1795. 
 216 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981) (noting that “[t]he law of 
contracts facilitates our disposing of [these] rights on terms that seem best to us.  
The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions individuals make of their 
rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have 
rights”). 
 217 Id.  Professor Fried observes that in the last fifty years this notion of contractual 
obligation as “essentially self-imposed” is not as unquestioned as it once was.  It may 
be argued, he notes, that “intermediate institutions,” such as the state, the union, 
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communitarian ethic asks whether the social or legal regime 
promotes individual human dignity by allowing individuals to 
contribute to “sustainable forms of community life.”218  It actively 
promotes “the social dimension of human existence,”219 and 
recognizes that a flourishing society consists not in a ruthless pursuit 
of self-gratification, but in personal fulfillment achieved in 
community.220  The communitarian strand in Catholic Social Thought 
recognizes that we each contribute to the health of a reality greater 
than ourselves and, in turn, are personally enriched by our 
participation therein.221 
The notion that the human person has a need for development 
in society is firmly established.  According to Aristotle, man is by 
nature a social being who forms a variety of associations, including 
families, neighborhoods, and cities, to accomplish a good of which he 
is incapable alone.222  During his nineteenth century tour of America, 
Tocqueville observed similarly that one of the most distinguishing 
features of our society was its propensity to form associations for a 
variety of purposes.223  He observed that voluntary associations are 
essential in a democratic society because individually men are 
powerless to accomplish their goals.224  These communities were 
united by popular adherence to an “agreed-upon set of norms.”225  St. 
 
and the corporation have reduced man’s individual capacity overall for unfettered 
contract formation.  The argument, therefore, that the Vizcaino court’s decision is an 
affront to the integrity of contract seems somewhat disingenuous. 
 218 TAM, supra note 77, at 7 (listing three central communitarian principles: 1. A 
society’s determinations of what is “true’ can only be made by cooperative enquiry.  
2. The responsibilities of individual members of society can be based only on 
common values as determined by the community.  3. Society must be re-structured to 
allow all citizens equal participation in deciding how power will be exercised over 
them). 
 219 See supra note 192. 
 220 See TAM, supra note 77, at 7. 
 221 Gaudium et Spes 25, supra note 210, at 224. 
 222 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS at B. 
 223 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Alfred A. Knopf 1984). 
 224 Id. at 107.  Tocqueville even proposed that “civilization itself would be 
endangered” if human beings did not cultivate the habit of forming associations.  Id.  
This is because a society that prevented its citizens from banding together to 
accomplish “great things” would necessarily devolve into “barbarism.”  Id.  Most 
tellingly, Tocqueville warned that “[i]f men are to remain civilized or to become so, 
the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the 
equality of conditions is increased.”  Id. at 110.  He seems to be suggesting that a 
culture which strives for social equality must simultaneously encourage the formation 
of civic associations or it will fail. 
 225 Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald J. Russello, Community and American Federalism: 
Images Romantic and Real, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 683, 689 (1997) (describing the 
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Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher whose political theory underlies 
Catholic Social Thought, asserted that without social interaction man 
may live, but he may not live well.226  Likewise in the encyclical 
Gaudium et Spes, the Church echoed the sentiment: “Man’s social 
nature makes it evident that the progress of the human person and 
the advance of society itself hinge on each other.”227 
Our work environments then should also reflect this profound 
social instinct in man.  The most obvious manifestation of employees 
coming together in a cooperative venture is the labor union.  
Without some effective means of addressing workplace issues, the 
contingent employee can expect less take-home pay, less health 
insurance, less retirement benefits, and less legal protection.228  Yet an 
individual employee protesting these inequities risks discharge when 
he raises the issue with his employer.  The freedom to associate and 
form groups based on shared interests and common concerns is an 
essential right.  This is one of the most vital elements in the Catholic 
tradition because it represents the confluence of various integral 
principles: that man possesses an important social inclination; that 
this social nature requires man to rise above his weakness in pursuing 
a narrow individualism at the expense of the common good; that in 
the tradition of subsidiarity, people are called to collectively resolve 
their disputes.  Contingent workers must be permitted to exercise 
their right of association at work.  In language reminiscent of Leo 
XIII, the NLRB in M.B. Sturgis, Inc. decided that the temporary 
workers could not be denied collective bargaining rights because they 
shared a “community of interest” with their permanent colleagues.  
The community of interest standard is an implicit recognition of the 
 
classical notion of community as “a small, bounded, voluntary association, 
intermediate between the individual and the state, brought into being with a limited 
social agenda”). 
 226 Aquinas posited two reasons for man’s involvement in social life: The first is for 
the furnishment of necessities and the second is for the moral development that 
allows for a higher form of existence, which is achieved through civic involvement.  
See VERNON J. BOURKE, THE POCKET AQUINAS 232 (1960). 
 227 THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 210, at 224.  
 228 See Cook, supra note 11, at 15, citing the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ findings 
that: 
[contingent workers] take home nearly $100 less per week than their 
nominally permanent counterparts . . . 20% of contingent workers 
receive employer health insurance, compared with more than 50% of 
noncontingent workers . . . one-fourth of contingent workers are 
eligible for employer pension plans, while nearly half of permanent 
workers qualify.  Perhaps most significantly, the vast majority of 
contingents fall through vast loopholes in worker-protection laws . . . . 
Id. 
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right of people similarly situated to form associations.  This does not 
necessarily mean that contingent workers have no place in the 
economy.  It does mean, however, that employers may not use 
“temporary” workers in a permanent capacity without extending to 
these workers the same benefits accorded permanent employees. 
Rather than imposing a blanket rule for the treatment of 
contingent workers, the NLRB opened the channels for these 
workers to participate in crafting policies that will affect them 
personally.  In the best tradition of subsidiarity, the accretion of 
temps into existing bargaining units maintains decision-making at the 
level of the workplace community.  The temp unions that may result 
from this decision will only promote efficiency and equity in the 
context of dispute resolution.  Bargaining as a unified voice, 
contingent workers can freely and openly discuss grievances and help 
to craft joint-solutions without fear of reprisals.  The result is an 
arrangement respecting the equal dignity of all parties concerned.  
Catholic Social Thought has always called for a “family wage,” and 
this consists of a just remuneration for work done and benefits 
necessary to maintain family life.229  Because of his legal classification, 
the law permits the temporary employee to work without these 
benefits.  It is morally unjustifiable to contend, as free-market 
advocates do, that the price at which labor is bought is rightly 
determined by the forces of supply and demand.230 
From the perspective of the individual contingent worker, a 
more participatory work environment respects his or her dignity as an 
independent moral agent.  It engages directly the subjective aspect of 
work and actively opposes the instrumentalist view of the worker that 
is so prevalent currently.  The degradation of the contingent worker 
that is the result of employers paying substandard wages and reduced 
benefits is directly linked to our culture’s over-emphasis on the 
objective231 aspect of labor.  Though there do appear to be some signs 
of change,232 a view persists that labor is the property of the employer 
 
 229 Laborem Exercens, supra note 33, at 379. 
 230 Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 213.  Lamoureux notes that market forces are 
not suited to set a just wage because “it ignores the fact that the laborer must work in 
order to live; that is, the employer is free to offer a substandard wage and can 
arbitrarily offer or withhold work.  The employee, however, is constrained by need to 
accept whatever is offered or go without work.”  Id.; see also YATES, supra note 37, at 10 
(“We [workers] have only our ability to work to sell, but they [management] have the 
jobs . . . .  It is a simple but powerful truth that working people and their employers 
do not face each other as equals . . . workers are replaceable.” 
 231 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 232 See STUDS TERKEL, WORKING at xii (Pantheon Books 1974) (1972): as early as 
thirty years ago the author noted that young Americans were questioning the 
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objectified as the means of producing profit.233  Work becomes merely 
the process by which business tasks are accomplished.234  Once 
employees are objectified in this manner, it is not difficult to 
understand why companies vigorously defend the independent 
contractor doctrine as a cost-effective measure.235  The Catholic 
emphasis on the dual nature of human labor, the objective and 
subjective, is a powerful challenge to the market liberal ideal.  The 
subjective conception of work elucidated in Laborem Exercens, that all 
work aids man in the process of self-realization, casts serious doubt on 
the contingent employment proposal.  In the subjective analysis, the 
temporary employee is not a factor in production, but “a conscious 
and free subject who decides about himself.”236  It restores a real sense 
of dignity to all work because it is performed by human beings, who 
are the source and measure of human dignity.237  And as the human 
creations of God, the temporary employee is endowed with a human 
nature and from this nature spring certain definite natural rights.238 
The Vizcaino decision recognized an important principle of 
justice; namely, that equal work deserves equal compensation.239  By 
using the common law employee doctrine, the Ninth Circuit was able 
to give this principle effect at the Microsoft Corporation.  Yet instead 
of placing the temporary and regular employees in a comparable 
position, the decision paradoxically created a more fractured and 
segregated work environment.  Rather than risk the same fate as 
Microsoft, employers have taken even bolder steps to separate 
permanent workers from temporary employees.240  The workplace is 
 
prevailing work ethic that one’s job was obligatory with no guarantee of personal 
fulfillment. 
 233 For a spirited attack of this view, see YATES, supra note 37, at 19-20, discussing 
the tendency of companies to reduce employees to another cost of production akin 
to a tool or machine. 
 234 Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 358. 
 235 Ness, supra note 1, at 4. 
 236 Laborem Exercens, supra note 33, at 358. 
 237 Id. at 364. 
 238 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1956 (Doubleday 1995) (“The natural 
law, present in the heart of each man and established by reason, is universal in its 
precepts and its authority extends to all men.  It expresses the dignity of the person 
and determines the basis for his fundamental rights and duties.”) (quoting Cicero’s 
De Republica III). 
 239 Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 224 (noting that in the American context 
Catholic just wage theory has been influential in securing greater rights for women 
in the workplace.  For example, the National Council of Catholic Women urged 
legislatures to enact laws regarding “minimum wages, limitations on hours, equal pay 
for equal work, overtime pay, pension, and maternity benefits.”). 
 240 Forster, supra note 3, at 555-56 (noting that employers have gone so far as to 
require contingent workers to wear distinctive badges, to refuse to invite them to 
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less a cooperative environment than it is a disjointed collection of 
discrete groups discouraged from associating with one another.  It 
must be remembered that these groups often are doing the same jobs 
under the same supervisors.  By virtue of these similarities, the 
permanent and temporary workers share job-related interests and 
concerns, yet worker solidarity and the resulting associations and 
groups are conspicuously absent. 
The issue of contingent work reminds us that law has a moral 
dimension.241  While law and morality may operate in theoretically 
distinct spheres, their related function as shapers of human conduct 
inevitably leads to conflict.242  Often the law stirs deep moral 
resentment when it supports or maintains structures that do not 
comport with one’s moral sense, however one may define it.243  Yet a 
legal regime that does not reinforce a society’s moral sentiment risks 
its legitimacy and consequently the citizens’ adherence to its 
precepts.244  This Comment has proceeded from this very premise, 
 
company social gatherings, and to disallow them from using company parking lots). 
 241 DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 57 (1964) (noting that law and morality share 
common concerns.  Both “are concerned to impose certain standards of conduct 
without which human society would hardly survive and, in many of these 
fundamental standards, law and morality reinforce and supplement each other as 
part of the fabric of social life.”). 
 242 Id. at 67-69 (positing that there are three theoretical responses to conflicts 
between the positive law and and the moral law: 1. the Judeo-Christian response 
essentially denies any conflict because “the moral law dictates the actual content of 
human law.”  Id. at 68.  For the medieval Scholastic philosopher, this is akin to the 
notion of human law as derivative of the natural law, which in turn descends from 
the divine law.  See St. Thomas Aquinas, The Treatise on Law Questions 90-97, in ST. 
THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 44-54 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., 1988).  2. The 
Hegelian/Hobbesian response resolves any apparent divergence by collapsing law 
and morality into one.  Thus, man’s moral obligation is simply to obey the law.  Id. at 
68.  In this view, the distinction between just and unjust laws is an unwarranted one 
since law is inherently just and deserving of the people’s obeisance.  Id. at 3.  The 
legal positivist response acknowledges no conflict because law and morality are 
conceptually distinct and therefore one is incompetent to critique the other.  Id. at 
69.  As a means of critique, a moral system is able to evaluate only other moral 
systems using common moral criteria.  Id.  The same holds true for legal systems.  Id.  
Most importantly, “neither can resolve questions of validity save in its own sphere.”  
Id.  In practical terms, morality is in no position to judge law and law is incapable of 
evaluating morality.  Each makes no sense outside of its own domain.  Id.  To the 
legal positivist, therefore, the application of Catholic moral principles to 
labor/employment law is fundamentally incongruous. 
 243 See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990) (treating 
generally the seemingly intractable issue of abortion in American society).  Tribe 
notes, for example, the vigorous reaction to Roe v. Wade of the Catholic Church and 
the subsequent rise of the Catholic right-to-life movement.  Id. at 143. 
 244 LLOYD, supra note 241, at 32 (“For without such [legitimacy] . . . the automatic 
and impersonal operation of legal authority would cease to function and would be 
replaced by anarchy and disorder.”); see also Introduction to CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES 
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and has proposed Catholic social principles as the moral system 
against which the law relating to contingent employment is to be 
measured. 
Catholic Social Thought is a powerful tool in the transformation 
of workplace culture.  Its consistent emphasis on the dignity of 
individuals and the unique nature of man strikes at the core of the 
contingent worker problem.  At its root, the philosophy underlying 
contingent employment offends man in his individual and social 
disposition.  Catholic Social Thought advances the issue beyond mere 
freedom of contract and business necessity.  It provides an 
independent standard that promises to elevate the issue from 
competing employer/employee rights to objective human rights.245 
The application of Catholic Social Thought would achieve 
harmony between management and employees because it would 
promote a cooperative model of labor relations.  The adversarial 
model that has marked employment arrangements for so long would 
cede to a more collaborative practice.  Recognizing that each side 
shares in the responsibility of creating an environment that is both 
productive and human, employers and temporary workers will 
respect each other individually and work for a system that not only 
gets the job done, but respects people in the process. 
In addition, Catholic Social Thought will return to labor its 
inherent worth and dignity.246  Its comprehensive labor theory 
reminds us that ultimately work does not define man.  Man is not 
deserving of more or less respect by virtue of his job status.  
Therefore, any attempts to draw hierarchical distinctions between 
workers for purposes of employment benefits would be suspect.  The 
temporary nature of some contingent employment and the nominal 
distinction between “temporary” and “permanent” employees, for 
example, are not grounds for disparate treatment.  This would give 
pause to employers utilizing contingent workers as a means of 
lowering costs. 
Catholic Social Thought actively opposes our culture’s 
preoccupation with work as the defining element of our lives.  It 
restores to work its proper role as a means of subsistence and a 
 
ON LEGAL THOUGHT xix (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) (noting that “[i]t is 
important for a free people to connect the positive law to their ideals of a higher 
good.  Unless they perceive such a connection, the people will resist compliance with 
the law, and the state will be forced to turn to naked coercion.”). 
 245 Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 33, at 380 (cautioning that unions should be 
formed not merely to “struggle ‘against’ others,” but to further the aims of “social 
justice”). 
 246 Id. at 9, at 363-64. 
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contributing (though not defining) element of our personhood.  In 
the context of contingent work, the terms of employment cannot be 
justified simply by reference to a contract “freely made” between 
employer and employee.247  The employer would recognize that in 
addition to work, the contingent employee has obligations to himself, 
family, and community.  The employee meets these obligations in 
large part because his job does not require excessive hours with 
minimal pay.  Under Catholic Social Thought, employers are called 
upon to recognize these fundamental commitments and to refrain 
from imposing onerous conditions that detract from these 
responsibilities.  In concrete terms, the contingent worker would 
earn a “living wage,”248 enabling him to sustain the well-being of his 
family and contribute to the health of his community either through 
financial means or by donation of time. 
Furthermore, a vital contribution of Catholic Social Thought to 
the transformation of work is its emphasis on the labor union.249  One 
of the most significant hindrances to improving the conditions of 
contingent employees has been the law’s reluctance to afford 
collective bargaining rights to temps.250  Under Catholic Social 
Thought, temps would have the freedom to form unions in order to 
propose creative, group-formulated solutions to workplace issues.  In 
so doing, temps would satisfy the deep social instinct of people to 
associate according to common interests and desires.251  The 
fraternity of the union would thus aid in the process of individual 
self-realization as well as promote a more cooperative and 
representative workplace.252  M.B. Sturgis  is an encouraging sign that 
labor law is beginning to acknowledge the important role of the 
union in creating just working conditions. 
Finally, Catholic Social Thought would eradicate the very 
foundation that gave rise to the contingent worker phenomenon—
 
 247 Rerum Novarum 34, supra note 18, at 31. 
 248 Lamoureux, supra note 70, at 219 (“A laborer’s right to a living wage is the 
concrete expression of the general right that inheres in all people to obtain in a 
reasonable way as much of the common bounty of nature required to enable the 
laborer to maintain a decent livelihood.”). 
 249 Rerum Novarum 36, supra note 18, at 33; see also Laborem Exercens 20, supra note 
33, at 380. 
 250 See Chirag & Mehta, supra note 181, at 38-39. 
 251 Rerum Novarum 38, supra note 18, at 33 (noting that both the state and the 
union have identical premises; namely, “the natural propensity of man to live in 
society”). 
 252 Economic Justice For All 304, supra note 43, at 648 (describing the purpose of 
unions as “enabl[ing] workers to make positive and creative contributions to the 
firm, the community, and the larger society in an organized and cooperative way”). 
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the objectification of work.253  It would restore man as “the proper 
subject of work” and strive to create an environment where work has 
deeper subjective meaning.  The contingent worker, therefore, would 
no longer be simply a cost-effective means of getting the job done, 
but a free human being seeking fulfillment in his work and a sense of 
ownership in the process.  Mindful of these considerations, 
employers would be more likely to create environments where 
employee input is welcome and job satisfaction is valued. 
CONCLUSION 
The rights of contingent workers represents one of the most 
pressing labor and employment issues of the day.  These workers are 
among the most vulnerable in the workforce because the law provides 
them with few protections.  Unsurprisingly, employers are adamant 
that the contingent worker is an indispensable tool in the evolving 
labor market.  By utilizing temporary employees, the employer cuts 
costs through reduced salaries and benefits.  He also achieves 
maximum flexibility because he can hire and fire as demand requires 
with relatively slight legal consequences.  These boons for 
management, however, often come at great cost to the contingent 
employee.  Less take-home pay, often non-existent benefits, 
alienation in the workplace, and decreased job security are just a few 
of the drawbacks.  Management’s asserted right to make strategic use 
of human labor and employees’ claims to certain minimal guarantees 
appear irreconcilable.  What is required is a profound transformation 
of the culture of work: a more balanced view that envisions labor not 
as an instrumentality to be effectively exploited, but as a deeply 
human activity that sanctifies as it creates.  Only then will man cease 
to be the object of work and instead become the subject, the one who 
labors for himself and thereby truly participates in the ongoing 
process of creation. 
 
 253 Laborem Exercens 5, supra note 33, at 358. 
